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Under the system of appointing regional governors by the president, which existed in Russia 
between 2005–2012, governors’ loyalty to the central government and particularly their 
ability to deliver satisfactory results to the ruling party in national-level elections were crucial 
to their likelihood of being re-appointed for the next term. In this paper, we show that 
governors, anticipating the relationship between loyalty and re-appointments, attempted to 
increase their likelihood of being re-appointed by delivering additional votes to the ruling 
party, and that these attempts were subject to regional political cycles. We argue that 
delivering satisfactory results may have different importance to a governor depending on the 
stage of his term at which elections are held. If elections are held close to the expiration of a 
governor’s current term, the results are likely to be pivotal to his further political career. 
Exploiting variation in the starting and expiry dates of Russian regional governors’ terms of 
office, we find that the winning margins for a pro-government party across Russian regions 
in national-level elections held between 2007–2012 were substantially higher when elections 
were closer to the expiration of a regional governor’s term. However, for elections held 
between 1999–2004, when governors were subject to a direct vote by the regional population, 
no similar effect is found. We then implement several exercises to identify the source of the 
additional votes for the ruling party and demonstrate that governors, while unlikely using the 







JEL-Classification: D72, D73, P26 


















There is much evidence showing that politicians change their behavior during terms of office in 
systematic ways. This is particularly true for elected politicians: prior to elections, incumbents 
may inflate public expenditures (Akhmedov & Zhuravskaya, 2004; Ehrhart, 2011; Guo, 2009), 
shift the composition of expenditures towards more publicly visible projects (Aidt, Veiga, & 
Veiga, 2011; Drazen & Eslava, 2010; Schneider, 2010), stimulate job creation (Labonne, 2016; 
Mechtel & Potrafke, 2013; Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2009), increase overt anti-corruption activities 
when voters care greatly about corruption (Khemani, 2004; Vadlamannati, 2015), tolerate 
violations of the law when the electorate is poor (Holland, 2015), engage in dubious activities to 
raise funds for their campaigns (Mironov & Zhuravskaya, 2016), and release overly optimistic 
economic forecasts (Boylan, 2008), etc.1  
However, the literature on the behavior of appointed politicians remains scarce. Several recent 
studies show that the behavior of appointed politicians is also often driven by political cycles, 
although in a different manner than in the case of elected politicians. While being generally less 
likely to engage in opportunistic behavior (Enikolopov, 2014; Hessami, 2017), appointed 
politicians still respond to incentives generated by political cycles, for example, engaging in 
corruption more intensively when expecting not to be re-appointed (Sidorkin & Vorobyev, 
2018). In this paper, we contribute to the literature on the behavior of appointed politicians in 
two ways. First, we demonstrate that appointed regional governors in Russia influence the 
results of national-level elections in their regions in order to signal their loyalty to the central 
government and thus to increase their chances of being re-appointed. Second, we show that 
such signaling is subject to regional political cycles; that is, the magnitude of the signaling 
systematically changes over governors’ terms of office.  
It has been well established that in Russia since the beginning of 2000s, the loyalty of 
regional governors to the central government and, more specifically, their ability to mobilize 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive review of the literature on politicians’ behavior driven by political cycles see, e.g. De Haan 
and Klomp (2013). 




votes for the ruling party2 in national-level elections was highly valued and rewarded both 
financially and politically. For example, Rochlitz (2014) establishes a strong positive 
relationship between the electoral results of the ruling party in a region and the scale of the 
involvement of government officials in illegal corporate raiding in this region, arguing that 
regional officials are allowed to participate in illegal financially rewarding activities in 
exchange for the ability to deliver satisfactory electoral results. Reuter and Robertson (2012) 
find that under the system of appointing regional governors by the president, which existed in 
Russia from 2005 until 2012, electoral outcomes in national-level elections have a strong impact 
on appointment decisions, while regional economic development and the quality of governance 
play, at most, a limited role in appointments. This finding is confirmed by, for example, 
Reisinger and Moraski (2013), Gelman (2008), Gelman (2010), and Rochlitz (2016).  
Given that the satisfactory results of the ruling party in national-level elections are rewarded, 
governors who expect to face a re-appointment decision should exert efforts to deliver positive 
results if they seek re-appointment. However, delivering satisfactory results in particular 
national-level elections may have a different value to a governor, depending on the stage of his 
term at which the elections are held. Suppose the president assesses a governor and decides 
whether to re-appoint him based on how the governor handles the tasks he faces over his term 
with time discounting, i.e. putting higher weights on the outcomes of more recent tasks. As 
discussed above, delivering good results for the ruling party in national-level elections seems 
to be one of such tasks in Russia. Then, other things being equal, the closer elections are held 
to the moment of the re-appointment decision, the higher their effect on the governor’s 
assessment by the president. Therefore, if elections are held close to the expiration of a 
governor’s current term, their outcomes are more important to the governor’s further career 
than when elections are held, for example, in the middle of the term. In the latter case, elections 
might not be as important since the governor still has time to prove his loyalty to the president 
and competence through other channels.  
                                                 
2 Through this paper, when using the term “ruling party” we refer to the United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya) party in 
the case of parliamentary elections, and to the incumbent president or a candidate supported by him in the case of 
presidential elections, i.e. Vladmir Putin in 2000, 2004 and 2012, and Dmitriy Medvedev in 2008. 
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If the importance of particular national-level elections has a different value to a governor at 
different stages of his term, there should be a systematic pattern in the governor’s pre-election 
activity and, as a result, in voting outcomes, which can be explained by regional political cycles. 
In this paper, we test for the presence of such a pattern. Specifically, exploiting variation in the 
starting dates and length of Russian regional governors’ terms in office, we first test the hypothesis 
that for the 2005–2012 period (more specifically in 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012 when national-level 
elections were held), i.e. the years when the appointment system existed, the winning margins of 
the pro-government party or candidate in national-level elections in Russian regions are higher 
when elections are held closer to the expiration of a regional governor’s term. Our analysis 
provides strong evidence of loyalty signaling through votes: the ruling party obtains up to 10 
additional percentage points in its victory margin in elections held 6 months before the expiration 
of a governor’s term than in elections held at the beginning or in the middle of the term.  
However, we do not find any similar pattern for the national-level elections held between 
1999–2004, i.e. the period when governors were subject to a direct vote by the regional 
population. Since it is unlikely that voters value ruling party electoral results in a way similar 
to the president, governors, who are subject to a direct election, should not have similar 
incentives to deliver votes to the ruling party as those governors who are subject to appointment 
decisions. One may argue that the elections of regional governors could be controlled by the 
central authorities to the extent that would make elections not much different from 
appointments. However, regional elections in Russia between 1999–2004 were relatively 
competitive and were certainly not controlled to a great extent.3  
Indeed, governors could seek support from the president and ruling party in regional-level 
elections in an attempt to “please” them with votes in national-level elections. In such a case, 
they would have incentives to signal their loyalty via extra votes similar to the incentives of 
governors who are subject to appointment, and we could observe a pattern in victory margins 
similar to that established for the 2007–2012 elections, though of a smaller magnitude. 
However, we do not find any evidence of this. 
                                                 
3 For example, Golosov (2011) and McFaul and Stoner-Weiss (2008) suggest that the 1999 elections were among 
the freest and the most competitive in contemporary Russia. Since that time, the fairness and competition of 
elections have been gradually deteriorating. For instance, after the 2011 and the 2012 elections, after not being 
allowed to monitor the 2007 and the 2008 elections, the OSCE mission reported deteriorating conditions for fair 
electoral competition. Individual reports can be accessed at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/russia. 




We then attempt to understand the nature of the increase in victory margins in national-
level elections between 2007–2012, and identify the sources of the extra votes for the ruling 
party. Potentially, there could be many ways for governors to deliver these extra votes. First, 
governors may affect election results indirectly, boosting support for the ruling party in their 
regions by, for example, exerting effort to perform in publicly valued sectors or increasing 
voters’ income (via transfers, wage increase, lowering taxes, etc). Second, governors may 
affect election results directly, without increasing actual support for the ruling party, by either 
committing electoral fraud or by changing the electorate composition in favor of the ruling 
party, i.e. by stimulating turnout among ruling party supporters and/or by discouraging 
turnout among opposition supporters. In this paper, we focus on direct mechanisms only, 
because: 1) they are more likely to be used by the governors due to lower costs and higher 
efficiency relative to indirect mechanisms; 2) there is a substantial number of possible indirect 
mechanisms, and studying all of them consistently and comprehensively is unlikely to be 
feasible; 3) we show that the ruling party’s popularity does not systematically vary over 
governors’ terms, and thus we do not have a good reason to believe that indirect methods are 
extensively used.  
Exploring which direct mechanisms governors may use to deliver additional votes to the 
ruling party, we test two hypotheses. Our first hypothesis is that the driving force for the 
observed pattern in victory margins is the higher participation of ruling party supporters 
arising from mobilization efforts taken by governors. There is much evidence that in-office 
politicians mobilize votes in Russia. For example, Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi (2018) and 
Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi (2014) show that extensive voter mobilization was an integral 
part of the 2011 parliamentary elections and the 2012 presidential elections, and it occurred 
primarily at workplaces in the public sector as well as in state-owned and affiliated 
companies. The extent of mobilization efforts was particularly large in companies which have 
more leverage over employees, e.g. in large companies located in towns dominated by a single 
company or industry. In addition, instances of mobilization efforts occurred in, e.g., primary 
schools where teachers put pressure on parents, in universities where administrations exerted 
an influence on students and faculty members, and even in hospitals where doctors pressured 
patients.  
Extra Votes to Signal Loyalty 
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If governors, when approaching their term expiry date, use additional resources to stimulate 
turnout among potential ruling party supporters (e.g. among government, state-owned 
companies’ or government-affiliated companies’ employees), we should observe an increase in 
both overall turnout and in mobilization efforts similar to the increase in victory margin. We 
find some supporting evidence for this hypothesis, but argue that turnout stimulating activities 
observed in regions where governors are about to finish their terms cannot fully explain the 
additional ruling party votes, and thus there must be other reasons for the pattern we discovered.  
Since it is well established that from the beginning of the 2000s, electoral fraud had been a 
widespread phenomenon in Russia (Enikolopov, Korovkin, Petrova, Sonin, & Zakharov, 2013; 
Lukinova, Myagkov, & Ordeshook, 2011; Moser & White, 2017; Myagkov, Ordeshook, & 
Shakin, 2009; Skovoroda & Lankina, 2017; Treisman, 2009), we further conjecture that the 
increase in ruling party victory margins may come not only from the mobilization of voters, but 
also from electoral manipulations implemented at the regional level. We use several distinct 
regional-level measures of fraud designed to capture various fraud techniques, and test the 










In 1993, when the current Constitution of Russia was adopted, there were 89 constituent entities 
(“federal subjects”) in the country. Between 2003 and 2007, several mergers took place, and since 
then there have been 83 federal subjects in Russia.4 For simplicity, we refer to them as “regions”. 
Since 1996, following the decision of the Constitutional Court of Russia, governors 
(“gubernators”) of all the regions had to be directly elected by the population. At the end of 2004, 
the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, introduced a reform that abolished direct elections: from 
that time regional governors were appointed by the president. Though formally the new procedure 
assumed that the president would simply nominate a candidate for governor while the regional 
parliament could approve or reject the candidate, there was no single case in which the parliament 
of a region did not approve a presidential nominee. The reform was approved by the Parliament of 
Russia in December 2004, and the last direct elections took place in February 2005. Because the 
reform assumed the replacement of elected governors after the expiration of their terms, and the 
date of expiration varied significantly across the regions, the full replacement of elected governors 
took about 5 years. The first appointed governor took office in February 2005, while the term of 
the last elected governor expired in December 2009, and from that time all the governors were 
appointed until October 2012 when direct elections were re-established. The variation in the dates 
of governors’ appointments across the regions can be mainly explained by differences in local 
legislation that allowed for different term lengths (usually 4 or 5 years) as well as a high degree of 
freedom for regions in setting the dates of gubernatorial elections in the past. Because of this, we 
believe that the variation in the dates of governors’ appointments and thus in the dates of the 
expiration of their term across regions can be considered exogenous.  
In this paper, we study four national-level elections held during the existence of the 
appointment system (parliamentary on December 2, 2007 and December 4, 2011, and 
presidential on March 2, 2008 and March 4, 2012), and four national-level elections held before 
the introduction of governors’ appointments (parliamentary on December 19, 1999 and 
December 7, 2003, and presidential on March 26, 2000 and March 14, 2004). Throughout the 
paper, we refer to the corresponding periods as “2007–2012” or “appointment” period, and 
“1999–2004” or “election” period, respectively.  
                                                 
4 This number includes 46 “oblasts”, 21 “republics”, 9 “krays”, 4 “autonomous okrugs”, 2 “cities of federal 
significance”, and 1 “autonomous oblast”. 
Extra Votes to Signal Loyalty 
 
 7 
There could be some concerns regarding the inclusion of the 1999 parliamentary elections 
in our analysis, since they were somewhat different from the other elections we study. First, in 
contrast to the other elections in our sample, which were held during the presidency of Vladimir 
Putin, the 1999 elections were held during Boris Yeltsin’s presidency. Second, it is not quite 
clear what “ruling party” means for the 1999 elections, since there were two competing pro-
government parties, “Unity” (“Yedinstvo”) and “Fatherland – All Russia” (“Otechestvo – Vsya 
Rossiya”). Nevertheless, both parties were considered prospective “ruling parties” and enjoyed 
the support of different regional governors (Golosov, 2011), later merging into a single party 
“United Russia” (“Yedinaya Rossiya”). In the end, we decided to include these elections in our 
analysis because we believe that these differences do not make the story of loyalty signaling 
via national-level election results irrelevant, and because the presence of the 1999 elections 
allows us to have the same number of elections in “election” and “appointment” periods, 
making our analysis more balanced.5 
Further, we restrict our attention to the analysis of elections held before 2012 only, and do 
not consider the 2016 parliamentary elections and the 2018 presidential elections for several 
reasons. First, in 2012 the appointing system was abolished and direct gubernatorial elections 
were restored.6 It would be worth considering the latest election period, which started in 2012, 
but because only two national-level elections have been held so far, the data are limited. 
Second, even when there are enough new elections to extend our analysis (e.g. in 2024), we 
will unlikely be able to do so in a similar way we do now, because since 2012 we have been 
gradually loosing cross-regional variation in the timing of regional elections with the respect 
to national elections. With effect from 2012, all regional-level elections are held on the same 
date, and it has become a general practice to allow governors to stay several months longer 
in their offices or to appoint acting governors upon completion of regular terms in order to 
have elections in several regions on a single day.7 As a result, the variation across regions in 
                                                 
5 In fact, our results are robust to the exclusion of the 1999 elections, and are available upon request.  
6 Except in 6 southern ethnic republics (Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia 
and North Ossetia-Alania) and 3 northern “autonomous okrugs” (Khanty Mansiysk, Yamalo-Nenets and Nenets), 
where governors are elected by regional parliaments. 
7 There were 5 regional elections in the “unified election day” in 2012, 8 in 2013, 30 in 2014, 24 in 2015, 9 in 
2016, and 17 in 2017. 




the moment of time at which a governor faces national-level elections, which is essential for 
our analysis, vanishes, and soon there will be just 5 groups of governors facing national-level 
elections in the their first, second, third, fourth, or fifth year of term, but at exactly the same 
moment within each group.  
In our analysis, we do not consider three ethnic southern regions, Chechnya, Dagestan and 
Ingushetia. First, these regions have very different patterns in voting behavior since almost all 
of their inhabitants are muslims (96%, 94%, and 98%, respectively). 8  Second, they are 
infamous for extensive electoral manipulations and not fully reliable official electoral data.9 
Third, for these regions, some socioeconomic data we use in the analysis, particularly from the 
1999–2004 period, are either missing or not completely reliable and comparable to the data 
from other regions due to military conflicts that took place in this part of Russia at that time. 
For these reasons, the regions are hardly comparable to the other Russian regions, although all 
the results presented in this paper are robust to the inclusion of these regions in the dataset.10 
Thus, we study 80 regions over 4 elections during the election period (1999–2004) and over 4 
elections during the appointment period (2007–2012). 
 
  
                                                 
8 Kabardino-Balkaria, the 4th region by the share of the muslim population, has 70%, and the 5th region, Karachay-
Cherkessia, has 54.6%. 
9 In these regions, the average officially-reported turnout across the elections we analyze is 94.5%, 87.9%, and 
85.9%, respectively, and the average ruling party share is 96.8%, 83.0%, and 87.9%, respectively. In contrast, the 
corresponding numbers for the rest of the country are 64.1% and 55.3%. 
10 The estimation results are available upon request. 
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3. Main Analysis 
3.1 Data and Estimation Strategy 
We first want to test whether shorter time until the expiration of terms, and hence until the re-
appointment decision, makes governors more likely to signal their loyalty through delivering better 
election results to the ruling party in national-level elections. We conduct the test for the election 
period (1999–2004) and for the appointment period (2007–2012) separately. Specifically, for each 
period we estimate the following panel data model using the following fixed effects estimator: 
 , (1)
 
where  is the ruling party vote share in region i in elections in year , ∈
2007,2008,2011,2012  for the appointment period, and ∈ 1999,2000,2003,2004  for 
the election period.  is the number of months in office the governor of region  is left 
with at the moment of national-level elections in year t. For instance, if in March 2012, when 
the 2012 presidential elections were held, the governor of region i has 1 year and 3 months 
more in office, i.e. the expected end of his term is in June 2013, , 15.  
are various control variables for region, governor, and election characteristics;  is a time-
invariant regional fixed effect,  is the election year dummy, and  is the error term.  
To estimate model (1), we use the regional-level electoral results of the national-level elections 
held between 1999 and 2012, which come from the Central Election Commission of Russia 
(www.cikrf.ru). Additionally, we use regional-level data on the economic and demographic 
characteristics of the Russian regions in election years, which come from the Russian Federal 
State Statistics Service (www.gks.ru). These data include per capita gross regional product, 
unemployment rate, inflation rate, urbanization rate, as well as the numbers of retired people and 
people living below the poverty line per 1,000 of the population.11 We also use data on regional 
governors’ characteristics, including age, length of in-office tenure, and background collected 
from open sources, such as governors’ web pages, Wikipedia, and online media. The full list and 
description of the control variables used in model (1) is presented in Table 7 of the Appendix.  
                                                 
11 Since presidential elections are held in March and parliamentary elections areheld in December, we use previous 
year values of regional variables for presidential elections and current year values for parliamentary elections. 




In order to more accurately test the hypothesis that governors try to signal their loyalty to 
the central government in an attempt to increase their likelihood of being re-appointed more 
accurately, we exclude several observations from our panel. First, we drop 9 observations from 
the appointment period (2007–2012) in which governors actually finished their terms within a 
month after national-level elections. We believe that in these cases, the re-appointment 
decisions were likely made before the elections, and thus governors were not able to influence 
them via signalling and they likely had no incentives to do so. 12  Second, we drop 11 
observations from the election period in which governor elections were hold simultaneously 
with national-level elections.13 Our concern is that in these cases governors were running their 
own campaigns and thus could affect ruling party support in their regions without an intention 
to signal their loyalty. Finally, we drop 2 cases in which governor offices were vacant at the 
moment of national elections.14  
When estimating model (1), we test different alternative functional forms for  to 
account for the potential non-linear relationship between  and the dependent variable 
. For this purpose, we first include polynomials of  up to the third degree. 
Second, we add  to the set of our controls, expecting that there could be a significant 
correlation between turnout and ruling party vote share. However, there could be uncontrolled 
factors, such as preferences of the electorate15 and electoral fraud16, that are correlated with 
both turnout and the ruling party vote share, resulting in biased coefficients when estimating 
equation (1). To address this problem, we instrument  with the average temperature 
on the day of elections and its square, assuming that the weather is likely to be a significant 
predictor of turnout but not of the vote share directly. Finally, to verify the robustness of the 
                                                 
12 For an example when it was publicly announced that a governor will be re-appointed a week prior to the expiration 
of his term: fwww.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/214/events/6172www.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/214/events/6172 (in 
Russian). 
13 In these cases, regional governors stayed in office up to several months less or more than determined by their 
term limits in order to held regional and national elections simultaneously, saving on organizational costs and 
encouraging voter turnout. 
14 There were acting governors in the Bashkortostan region in December 2003 and in the Perm region in March 2004. 
15 If, for example, ruling party supporters are more likely to participate than opposition supporters, there will be a 
natural positive correlation between turnout and ruling party vote share across regions. 
16 Fraud techniques, such as ballot stuffing and multiple voting, lead to an increase in both voter turnout and the 
beneficiary party vote share in the regions in which they occur. 
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timing effect further, we split governors’ terms into 10 equally-spaced time periods for every 6 
months and directly control for them with dummy variables. A dummy  ( ∈ 0,9 ) 
equals 1, if at the moment of national-level elections in year  the number of months the 
governor of region  was left in office with is between 6  and 6 1 . That is, for elections 
held in March 2012 in a region where the governor’s term expires in June 2013, the dummy for 
period 2, 2 , , is 1, while the dummies for all the other periods are 0.  
 (time dummies in the alternative specification) is our main variable of interest. As 
discussed in the previous section, variation in this variable comes from the fact that the 
expiration dates of governors’ terms across Russian regions vary greatly due to historical 
reasons as well as differences in regional electoral legislation. Given the nature of the variation, 
it could be considered exogenous to the dependent variables used throughout the analysis, 
which makes identification of the effects of interest possible.  
It is important to point out that we pool data from both presidential and parliamentary 
elections in our analysis. A potential concern here is that the observations from the two types 
of elections may not be directly comparable due to systematic differences in the nature of the 
data. In fact, the data are systematically different: both turnout and ruling party votes share are 
substantially higher in presidential elections. However, there is a systematic difference in means 
only, while the variances of both turnout and ruling party vote share do not substantially differ. 
Since in model (1), as well as in all the models below, we allow for election fixed effects ( ), 
the difference in means does not cause a problem. Figure 6 and Figure 7 of the Appendix 
present histograms of the main variables of interest (turnout and ruling party vote shares are 
demeaned to highlight the similarities in their distributions across different types of elections).  
 
3.2 Results 
Table 1 contains the results of estimating several specifications of model (1) with  
as the dependent variable for the 2007–2012 period, and Table 2 contains the results for the 
1999–2004 period. All the specifications are estimated by the fixed effects estimator and 
include regional economic variables, governors’ individual controls, and year effects. In the 
first specification, we estimate model (1) using the continuous measure (months) of the 




proximity of national-level elections, . To account for the non-linearity of the 
relationship between  and , we allow for the polynomial form of the variable 
of interest. We find that the polynomial terms of  up to the second (column 1) or third 
(column 2) degree give the most plausible results. Finally, we include turnout as an additional 
control and then, suspecting omitted variable bias, instrument it with the election day weather 
(column 3). 
 
Table 1: Baseline model (2007–2012). Dependent variable: Ruling party share 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Time  –0.326**  (0.147) –1.108*** (0.362) –0.934**  (0.470)  
Time2  0.006*** (0.002) 0.037*** (0.013) 0.034***  (0.013)  
Time3   –0.000**  (0.000) –0.000*** (0.000)  
Turnout      0.733  (1.374)  
Unemployment –0.787*** (0.288) –0.740 (0.278) –0.621*  (0.339)  
Real GRP  0.061*** (0.023) 0.067* (0.024) 0.044  (0.035)  
Natural resources (%) 0.109  (0.121) 0.157  (0.109) 0.205  (0.151)  
Urbanization  0.745**  (0.354) 0.845**  (0.384) 1.182  (0.851)  
Inflation  –0.244  (0.372) –0.106  (0.373) 0.139  (0.608)  
Retired –1.689  (1.144) –2.118*  (1.207) –0.952  (2.274)  
Poverty  –0.080  (0.182) –0.113  (0.184) –0.115  (0.175)  
Elected  –0.899  (1.647) –1.746  (1.630) –2.718  (2.588)  
External  –3.416**  (1.397) –2.959**  (1.429) –3.259**  (1.652)  
First term  –0.324  (1.896) –0.603  (1.826) –0.909  (1.894)  
Experience –0.145  (0.228) –0.183  (0.225) –0.311  (0.332)  
Governor’s age –0.495  (0.610) –0.396  (0.585) –0.603  (0.751)  
Governor’s age2 0.004  (0.006) 0.004  (0.005) 0.006  (0.007)  
Year=2008  4.891*** (0.753) 5.035*** (0.744) 1.176  (7.631)  
Year=2011  –16.734*** (3.858) –16.532*** (3.724) –13.750**  (6.352)  
Year=2012  –1.800  (3.855) –1.411  (3.736) –2.323  (3.983)  
R2 (within) 0.76   0.77   0.81   
R2 (between) 0.01   0.01   0.00   
R2 (overall) 0.01   0.01   0.05   
F  40.33   40.77     
Wald      43438.94  
Observations 311  311  311  
Regions  80  80  80  
Note: The table reports fixed effects (FE) estimates for quadratic (column 1) and cubic specifications (column 2) of model (1) 
as well as the for specification with endogenous variable  instrumented with the average temperature in a region on 
election day and its square (column 3). Standard errors clustered on Regions are in parentheses. 
* p 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.  
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Table 2: Baseline model (1999–2004). Dependent variable: Ruling party share 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Time  –0.003  (0.184) –0.836  (0.505) –0.270  (0.477)  
Time2  0.001  (0.003) 0.031*  (0.017) 0.013  (0.016)  
Time3   –0.000*  (0.000) –0.000  (0.000)  
Turnout      1.130**  (0.442)  
Unemployment 0.036  (0.252) 0.022  (0.245) 0.088  (0.172)  
Real GRP  0.015  (0.012) 0.017  (0.011) 0.016*  (0.009)  
Natural resources  0.042  (0.139) 0.041  (0.143) –0.230  (0.153)  
Urbanization  –1.592*  (0.903) –1.722**  (0.865) 0.131  (0.894)  
Inflation  –0.017  (0.137) –0.011  (0.138) 0.179  (0.143)  
Retired  –0.474  (0.593) –0.526  (0.592) 0.071  (0.473)  
Poverty  –0.137  (0.107) –0.127  (0.104) –0.058  (0.075)  
External  1.532  (3.106) 0.580  (2.599) 1.948  (2.530)  
First term  0.734  (1.806) 0.725  (1.784) –1.326  (1.619)  
Experience  0.045  (0.438) 0.090  (0.404) –0.282  (0.348)  
Governor’s age –0.864  (0.827) –0.928  (0.831) 0.379  (1.010)  
Governor’s age2 0.009  (0.008) 0.009  (0.008) –0.002  (0.010)  
Year=2000  16.979*** (1.081) 16.711*** (1.091) 9.056*** (3.428)  
Year=2003  0.388  (4.027) 0.514  (3.980) 14.083**  (6.315)  
Year=2004  32.792*** (3.981) 32.816*** (3.905) 35.806*** (3.281)  
R2 (within) 0.89   0.89   0.87   
R2 (between) 0.03   0.03   0.37   
R2 (overall) 0.31   0.29   0.75   
F  231.82   248.01     
Wald      30672.75  
Observations 307  307  307  
Regions  80  80  80  
Note: The table reports fixed effects (FE) estimates for quadratic (column 1) and cubic specifications (column 2) of model (1) as well as for 
the specification with endogenous variable  instrumented with the average temperature in a region on election day and its square 
(column 3). Standard errors clustered on Regions are in parentheses.  
* p 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.  
 
 
Overall, our results suggest that the stage of a governor’s term at which he faces national-
level elections and the electoral results of the ruling party are strongly related for the 2007–
2012 elections, but not for the 1999–2004 elections: the effect of  and its higher degrees 
are strongly significant in the first case, while they are almost nowhere significant at 
conventional levels in the second. Based on our estimates, we construct linear predictions of 
 as a function of  estimated at the means of all confounding variables to 
illustrate the dynamics of the national-level election results over governors’ terms. The 
predictions are depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2, charts (a) and (c). For the 2007–2012 period 
for all the specifications, we see a clear increase in ruling party vote share towards lower values 
of , which corresponds to a smaller amount of time a governor is left with in office at the 
moment of national-level elections. However, for the 1999–2004 period, the increase is 
insignificant, if any, and of a lower magnitude.  





Figure 1: Effect of  on ruling party vote share 
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One may also note a somewhat U-shaped relationship between  and  for 
the 2007–2012 period, particularly for the quadratic specification (Figure 1, chart (a)). This 
relationship might be driven by the particular assumption on quadratic relationship between 
the variables. When we use more flexible specifications (third degree polynomial and the 
specification with instrumented turnout), the right tail of the graph, which corresponds to the 
period of 48–60 months before the end of governors’ terms, flattens, while the increase in 
 closer to the term end, becomes clearer and large in magnitude.  
We then use 10 time dummies (periods) instead of  to measure the proximity of the 
national-level election to a governor’s expected end of term. The marginal effects from the 
estimations are illustrated in Figure 2, charts (b) and (d). Similar to the case of the continuous 
variable , the 1999–2004 graph is effectively flat, while the 2007–2012 graph shows a clear 
increase in ruling party vote share for the time periods close to term expiration. Again, in Figure 2 
one can see a somewhat weak U-shaped relationship between the timing of elections with respect 
to governors’ term stage and ruling party vote share for the 2007–2012 period. One reason for such 
a result could be the increased willingness of recently appointed or recently re-appointed governors 
to also signal their loyalty to the ruling party by delivering extra votes, thanking the government for 
the decision to appoint them or re-assuring it that the decision was correct. Some of our further 
results will provide additional, although rather weak, evidence that governors do something to 
deliver extra votes not only when they approach the end of their term, but also when they just start 
it. However, since the increase in vote share is much clearer at the end of the term than at the 
beginning, throughout this paper we primarily focus on the former.  
Overall, both approaches, dummies, and continuous measure give similar results: a clear 
increase in vote share of the ruling party in national-level elections when a governor approaches the 
end of his term for the 2007–2012 period and a much less clear trend, if any, for the 1999 – 2004 
period. Specifically, during the 2007–2012 period, if national-level elections are held within 1 year 
around the end of a governor’s term ( ∈ 0,12 , period dummies are 0–1), the ruling party’s 
share increases by about 7–10 percentage points compared to the middle of the term ( ∈
24,36 , periods 4–5). However, no similar effect is found for the 1999–2004 period.  
In addition to , the variable of interest, there are several other variables which have a 
significant effect on the electoral results of the ruling party in national-level elections. For a number 




of specifications we estimate, our results (see Table 1 and 2) suggest that, e.g., in 2007–2012 the 
ruling party receives more votes in more economically developed and prosperous regions with a 
higher share of urban population, regions with lower unemployment and in regions where 
governors are local as opposed to coming from another region17. The coefficient on the year 
dummies shows that the results of the incumbent in presidential elections are higher than the 
results of the ruling party in parliamentary elections, while they both substantially lost support 
in 2011–2012 compared to 2007–2008. However, over the first half of the 2000s, the electoral 
results of the ruling party were constantly increasing.  
  
                                                 
17 We treat a governor as local (vs. external) if he has significant experience or personal ties associated with the 
region, such as experience in local government, business or other organizations. The governor may originally come 
from another region, but may have several years of professional experience in this region prior to taking office. 
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4. Potential Explanations 
We have established that, in the regions where governors approach their term expiry date, the 
ruling party receives more votes in national-level elections. We then attempt to identify the 
sources of these additional votes. We first check whether the increase in the number of votes 
can be simply explained by the increase in support for the government in general.  
As we discussed above, governors may boost the support for ruling party in their regions by, 
e.g., exerting effort to perform in publicly-valued sectors or by affecting voters’ income. If 
governors do something that actually makes voters support the ruling party’s more and thus vote 
for it more, one should observe an increase in ruling party actual popularity, similar to the increase 
in vote shares we established. To test this hypothesis, we collect data on presidential approval 
ratings from two publicly available surveys conducted by Russian Public Opinion Research 
Center (VCIOM, https://www.wciom.com/) and then by Levada Center (www.levada.ru), the 
largest Russian non-governmental polling and sociological research organizations:  
 Courier Survey covers the period of 2003–2014.18 During the period we consider in our 
analysis (2003–2012), between 13 and 24 surveys were conducted every year.  
 Monitoring Survey (the monitoring of socio-economic changes) covers the period of 1993–
2012. During the period we consider, between 3 and 6 surveys were conducted every year.  
Both surveys ask respondents whether they approve of the actions of the president or not.19 
Based on the surveys, we construct two regional measures of ruling party support, taking the 
most recent survey for each election and averaging the respondents’ answers at the regional 
level.20 We use these two approval measures to estimate the following model using fixed effects 
for the 2007–2012 period:  
 , (2)
                                                 
18 In fact, the Courier Survey had been conducted since 1992, but the data before 2003 do not contain information 
about respondents’ regions, which is essential for our analysis. 
19 In some years, the surveys use not binary but Likert scale questions, offering respondents the possibility to 
assess whether they approve of the president’s policy and action on a scale from 0 to 4 or from 1 to 10. We 
transform all the answers in such cases into “yes” or “no” to have homogenous data. 
20 Though presidential approval and approval of the United Russia party are not indeed the same things, we still 
believe that they are highly correlated, and thus ameasure based on the presidential approval can be safely used 
for the purposes of our analysis. 




where  is again a vector of polynomials of  up to the third degree, and 
 is a vector of regional characteristics identical to that used above for the estimation 
of model (1). The results of the estimation are presented in Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 3. 
For both measure, the coefficients on all the degrees of  are insignificant, indicating no 
evidence that ruling party support prior to national-level elections in regions is affected in any 
way by the stage of the term at which regional governors face the elections. Moreover, Figure 3 
rather suggests that the president’s approval is more likely to decrease somewhat towards the 
end of a regional governor’s term. This finding suggests it is unlikely that governors do 
something that would positively affect actual ruling party support when attempting to signal 
their loyalty to the central government. This leaves us with a conjecture that governors affect 
electoral results in some direct way, without affecting true ruling party support. 
 
Table 3: The effect of Time on ruling party support. Dependent variable: Ruling party support 
 Courier survey Monitoring survey 
 (1) (2) 
Time  0.018  (0.012) 0.002  (0.013)  
Time2 –0.001  (0.000) –0.000  (0.000)  
Time3 0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000)  
Unemployment 0.008  (0.012) –0.012*  (0.007)  
Real GRP  –0.002  (0.001) –0.000  (0.001)  
Natural resources –0.000  (0.006) –0.007  (0.006)  
Urbanization –0.001  (0.017) 0.013  (0.011)  
Inflation  –0.011  (0.012) 0.019  (0.017)  
Retired  –0.034  (0.041) –0.061  (0.054)  
Poverty  –0.008  (0.010) –0.016*** (0.004)  
Elected  0.106*** (0.039) 0.004  (0.085)  
External  0.013  (0.038) 0.001  (0.055)  
First term  0.019  (0.061) 0.025  (0.052)  
Experience  –0.001  (0.010) 0.004  (0.007)  
Governor’s age –0.038*  (0.020) –0.016  (0.014)  
Governor’s age2 0.000*  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000)  
Year=2008  –0.022  (0.016) –0.006  (0.025)  
Year=2011  –0.239  (0.145) –0.056  (0.173)  
Year=2012  –0.230  (0.158) –0.023  (0.178)  
R2 (within) 0.65   0.56   
R2 (between) 0.05   0.07   
R2 (overall) 0.17   0.13   
F  52.19   31.74   
Observations 171   183   
Regions  47   63   
Note: The table reports fixed effects (FE) estimates. Standard errors clustered on Regions are in parentheses.  
* p 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.  




Figure 3: Effect of  on the president’s approval ratings 
 
We check two potential, and most straightforward, direct mechanisms of influencing 
electoral results: the mobilization of ruling party supporters and the manipulation of electoral 
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4.1 Voter Mobilization 
Our first idea is that governors may exert extra effort to mobilize groups of voters who are 
likely to be pro-government, such as public employees or employees of large private companies 
with established relationships with local political elites. Whether such an effort is fully legal 
(e.g. more active campaign targeting incumbent potential party supporters) or illegal (e.g. voter 
intimidation), it should result in a simultaneous increase in some measure of the effort and voter 
participation, similar to the observed increase in vote share.  
To test whether governors additionally stimulate voter turnout when they are close to their 
term expiry dates, we estimate two models. First, we check whether regional voter turnout 
follows a trend similar to the trend in vote share found in the previous section. For this purpose, 
we estimate the following panel data model using a fixed effects estimator:  
 , (3)
 
where  is the voter turnout in region i in elections in year ∈
2007,2008,2011,2012 . The rest of the elements are the same as in model (1).  
Second, we use a measure of governors’ mobilization effort based on the survey conducted 
by Levada Center immediately following the 2011 parliamentary elections.21 The survey is 
based on face-to-face interviews with about 1,600 Russian respondents in 45 regions who 
represent the Russian urban and rural population over 18 years of age. The survey question we 
use asks whether respondents experienced any pressure to participate in the election and to cast 
their votes for a particular party or candidate. As our regional measure of governors’ 
mobilization efforts, we take the share of respondents in a region who reported some pressure. 
We estimate the following cross-section model:  
 , (4) 
 
where  is the share of respondents in region  who reported pressure to participate 
in elections and to vote for a specific party.  
  
                                                 
21 The question we use for our analysis is available in the surveys after the 2011 elections only. 
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Table 4: The effect of Time on turnout (2007–2012) and mobilization efforts (2011) 
 Turnout Turnout Mobilization 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Time  –0.285*  (0.161) –0.356  (0.247) –0.016*  (0.009)  
Time2  0.005**  (0.002) 0.008  (0.009) 0.001*  (0.000)  
Time3    –0.000  (0.000) –0.000*  (0.000)  
Temperature  0.131  (0.131) 0.135  (0.129)   
Temperature2 0.002  (0.006) 0.002  (0.006)   
Unemployment –0.221  (0.283) –0.220  (0.284) 0.003  (0.009)  
RGRP  0.029*** (0.007) 0.030*** (0.007) –0.000  (0.000)  
Natural resources –0.052  (0.109) –0.047  (0.110) 0.002  (0.001)  
Urbanization –0.438  (0.403) –0.426  (0.401) 0.001  (0.001)  
Inflation  –0.266  (0.305) –0.253  (0.310) 0.022*  (0.012)  
Retired  –1.497  (1.033) –1.530  (1.038) 0.004  (0.006)  
Poverty  –0.000  (0.152) –0.004  (0.153) –0.001  (0.004)  
Elected  1.154  (1.753) 1.081  (1.779)   
External  0.126  (1.140) 0.145  (1.145) 0.057*  (0.031)  
First term  0.140  (1.429) 0.109  (1.446) –0.022  (0.042)  
Experience  0.141  (0.146) 0.137  (0.148) –0.003  (0.005)  
Governor’s age 0.312  (0.531) 0.323  (0.529) 0.023  (0.015)  
Governor’s age2 –0.003  (0.005) –0.003  (0.005) –0.000  (0.000)  
Married      –0.002  (0.017)  
Employed      0.065*** (0.017)  
Female      –0.028*  (0.017)  
Higher education     0.013  (0.021)  
Consumer status     0.009  (0.010)  
Children      0.009  (0.019)  
Year=2008  4.611*** (0.862) 4.603*** (0.858)   
Year=2011  –3.721  (3.448) –3.714  (3.465)   
Year=2012  1.562  (3.455) 1.596  (3.478)   
R2  0.50   0.50   0.03   
F  18.27   17.47   2.50   
Observations 310   310   1563   
Regions  80   80     
Note: The table reports fixed effects (FE) estimates (columns 1 and 2), and OLS estimates for column 3. Standard errors clustered on Regions 
(columns 1 and 2) and robust standard errors (column 3) are in parentheses.  
* p 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.  
 
The results of the fixed effects estimations of the model for turnout (model 3) are presented in 
Table 4, columns (1) and (2), and illustrated in Figure 4. Based on the estimations, we find some 
evidence of the relationship between  and voter turnout, although weak. On average, voter 
turnout is higher by about 2–4 percentage points in a region where the governor is about to finish 
his term of office compared to, e.g., a region where the governor is in the middle of his term.  





Figure 4: Effect of  on turnout (2007–2012) 
 
However, such an increase in turnout cannot explain all the increase in the vote share of the 
ruling party found in the previous section. Even if one assumes that all the additional voters 
cast their votes for the ruling party, then, given “normal” turnout of about 64% and “normal” 
ruling party vote share of 60%, additional 4 percentage points to turnout would result in only 
about 2 additional percentage points to the vote share of the ruling party, which is less than a 
quarter of the increase we find. 
 
 
Figure 5: Effect of  on mobilization efforts 
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We also find some evidence of the relationship between time and mobilization efforts 
(Table 4). Figure 5 illustrates that when a governor is left with less than 6 months in office, 
voters report pressure almost twice as often (about 25% of the respondents) as when a governor 
is left with 1–3 years (about 12%–15%). 
 
Table 5: The effects of Time on the measures of fraud 
 Fraud Moser Fraud Koenig Fraud Kobak Invalid Ballots 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time  0.090  (0.516) 0.707  (1.075) 0.013  (0.205) 0.031*  (0.015) 
Time2 0.004  (0.016) –0.022  (0.035) –0.003  (0.007) –0.001**  (0.001) 
Time3 –0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) 0.000*  (0.000) 
Turnout  1.585  (1.170) 1.257  (1.683) –0.192  (0.567)   
Unemployment 0.003  (0.448) 0.429  (0.921) 0.348*  (0.194) 0.042*** (0.014) 
RGRP  –0.018  (0.042) –0.056  (0.057) 0.005  (0.022) –0.001**  (0.001) 
Natural resources 0.206  (0.173) 0.246  (0.393) 0.020  (0.108) –0.008  (0.008) 
Urbanization 0.754  (0.786) 0.704  (1.164) 0.156  (0.400) –0.025  (0.020) 
Inflation  0.671  (0.526) 0.180  (0.903) 0.032  (0.369) –0.049**  (0.020) 
Retired  –2.233  (2.396) 2.265  (4.039) –0.151  (1.009) 0.042  (0.056) 
Poverty  0.265  (0.232) 0.636*  (0.386) –0.069  (0.087) –0.001  (0.009) 
Elected  3.718  (2.693) 0.962  (4.445) 0.444  (0.983) –0.103  (0.077) 
External  0.846  (1.593) –0.949  (2.994) 0.898  (0.853) –0.133**  (0.062) 
First term  –3.279  (1.997) 3.180  (3.913) –0.368  (0.792) –0.071  (0.097) 
Experience  –0.500*  (0.272) 0.563  (0.470) –0.022  (0.128) –0.029*** (0.010) 
Governor’s age –2.364*** (0.755) 2.326  (1.835) –0.200  (0.684) –0.045  (0.029) 
Governor’s age2 0.023*** (0.007) –0.021  (0.016) 0.003  (0.007) 0.000  (0.000) 
Year=2008  –6.722  (6.313) –4.468  (8.988) 1.834  (3.185) 0.137**  (0.067) 
Year=2011  15.087*** (5.853) 8.977  (9.074) –1.324  (4.335) 0.087  (0.206) 
Year=2012  5.390  (5.675) –1.624  (7.818) –0.247  (2.914) –0.345*  (0.199) 
R2 (within) 0.61   0.16   .   0.36   
R2 (between) 0.63   0.16   0.15   0.05   
R2 (overall) 0.63   0.16   0.09   0.00   
F        13.51   
  3159.47   1404.33   11087.82     
Observations 311   311   311   311   
Regions  80   80   80   80   
Note: The table reports the specifications with endogenous variable Turnout instrumented with the average temperature in a region on election day 
and its square (columns 1, 2 and 3) and fixed effects (FE) estimates for cubic (column 4) specification. Robust standard errors (columns 1, 2 and 3) 
and standard errors clustered on Regions (column 4) are in parentheses.  
* 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.  
 




Unfortunately, despite a very notable increase in mobilization effort closer to the term expiry 
date, the survey nature of our measure of mobilization effort does not allow us to interpret this 
increase in terms of extra votes to the ruling party, and thus to draw any conclusion as to what 
extent it can explain the previously established increase in the votes. 
 
4.2 Electoral Fraud 
Our second idea is that governors may deliver extra votes through increased electoral 
manipulations. To test this explanation, we use various measures of regional-level fraud as the 
dependent variable, and estimate the following model (5) with a fixed effects estimator:  
 , (5) 
where  is a measure of electoral fraud in region  in national-level elections in year 
. We use three fraud proxies. The first proxy is a popular forensic measure recently used, e.g., 
by Moser and White (2017) and Bader and van Ham (2015), which is based on the degree to 
which the precinct-level turnouts in a region deviate from the distribution they should follow 
when elections are clean (Klimek, Yegorov, Hanel, & Thurner, 2012; Myagkov et al., 2009). 
We construct our first measure of regional electoral fraud labeled  as a share of 
“potentially fraudulent” precincts in the region. A precinct is considered fraudulent if the 
turnout in it is greater than the national average turnout plus 1 standard deviation.  
The second proxy is based on the conjecture that people, while manually correcting electoral 
results, tend to use more integer numbers than should be the case when elections are clean. Such 
measures are used by, e.g., Kalinin and Mebane (2012) and Kobak, Shpilkin, and 
Pshenichnikov (2016). We measure fraud as a share of precincts in which the ruling party’s 
share is close to any integer percentage point +/–0.05 percentage points; that is, precincts with, 
e.g., reported ruling party vote share in the 49.95%–50.05% range are considered suspicious. 
We label this variable as .  
The third fraud proxy we use is a measure developed by Koenig (2015) and designed to 
capture fraud techniques that inflate the correlation between a rigging candidate’s vote share 
and turnout in precincts where fraud occurs, such as ballot stuffing. The idea behind the measure 
is that, while in the absence of fraud there should be no abnormally high correlation between 
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turnout and candidates’ vote shares in a precinct, ballot stuffing increases both turnout and the 
rigging candidates’ vote share, and hence the correlation between them. To construct this 
measure, we first regress ruling party vote share on turnout using OLS for each voting district 
(“TIK” – territorial electoral commission) where a unit of observation is a polling station 
(“UIK” – polling station electoral commission). If the coefficient on turnout is greater than 1, 
the district is labeled as fraudulent. The regional measure of fraud which we label as 
 is then the share of votes for the ruling party coming from the “fraudulent” 
districts in all ruling party votes in the region.  
Finally, we estimate the effect of  on the number of invalid ballots in a region. 
Although this number itself is of course not a measure of fraud, it allows us to capture another 
popular fraud technique when ballots for opposition candidates are being deliberately 
invalidated. If such a type of fraud takes place in a region, it should result in an increased 
number of invalid ballots in that region.  
Indeed, in all cases the resulting numbers may not be sufficiently good proxies for actual 
fraud since they do not directly measure how much extra votes the manipulating candidate 
received due to fraudulent activities, but they are indeed highly correlated with them: the more 
fraud has occurred in elections, the higher values of the measures are likely to be. The presence 
of such a correlation is sufficient for the purposes of our analysis.  
The results of the estimation of model (5) for distinct fraud measures designed to capture 
different electoral manipulation techniques, , , , and 
 are presented in Table 5, columns (1)–(4). The results suggest no evidence that 
the approaching end of a governor’s term affects manipulations, which implies no evidence that 
regional governors in Russia additionally use a means of electoral fraud to affect the outcomes 
of the national-level elections and thus to signal their loyalty to the central authorities. 
  




5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we highlight the incentive mechanism of regional governors in Russia to signal 
their loyalty to the president closer to the end of their terms through the results of ruling party 
national-level elections. In addition, we explore the mechanism’s possible channels. Our 
findings strongly suggest the presence of signaling through better electoral results. However, 
the methods used to achieve better results are not entirely clear.  
We establish that governors, when approaching the end of their terms and facing a re-
appointment decision, deliver more votes to the ruling party in national-level elections in their 
regions, and this increase does not seem to be driven by an increase in actual ruling party 
popularity. Mobilization of ruling party supporters, likely in the form of illegal pressure on 
voters, seems to be used to deliver these extra votes, but probably not exclusively: we argue 
that voter mobilization is unlikely to fully explain the additional votes for the ruling party. We 
further find no convincing evidence that electoral fraud can explain the rest of the votes.  
Overall, our findings suggest that even if governors directly affect the results of the ruling 
party in national-level elections by the stimulation of turnout among ruling party supporters, 
such a direct influence can unlikely be the only reason for the additional vote the ruling party 
tends to receive in regions where governors approach their term end. This leaves us with the 
conjecture that governors manipulate electoral results with other techniques than those that 
affect voter turnout and that can be captured by our measures of fraud, such as harassing 
opposition supporters, restricting the access of opposition candidates and supporters to the 
media, or manipulating the final numbers in a relatively sophisticated manner. However, the 
data that we managed to obtain so far do not allow us to test these potential alternative 
explanations.  
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Figure 6: Kernel densities of electoral statistics by elections (1999–2004) 
 
 
Figure 7: Kernel densities of electoral statistics by elections (2007–2012) 
 
Table 6: Summary statistics: Dependent variables 
 Obs  Min  Max  Median  Mean  St. Dev. 
1999–2004        
Ruling party share (%) 307 24.84 96.49 46.73 49.527 16.40  
Turnout (%) 307 43.85 97.71 62.39 63.001 8.792  
2007–2012        
Ruling party share (%) 311 29.02 96.11 62.02 61.071 13.22  
Turnout (%) 311 47.10 98.38 63.53 65.230 10.67  
Fraud Moser  311 0.432 99.72 9.024 19.289 23.06  
Fraud Kobak  311 5.517 40.39 11.54 12.996 5.456  
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Table 7: Summary statistics: Independent variables 
 Obs Min Max Median Mean St. Dev. 
1999–2004        
Unemployment: unemployment rate (%) 307 1.300 32 11.10 11.786 4.807  
RGRP: real gross regional product per capita (trillions of 2005 rubles) 307 16.07 791.8 55.90 82.913 105.1  
Natural resources: share of natural resources in GRP (%) 307 0 81.94 1.377 8.447 15.95  
Urbanization: urbanization rate (%) 307 25.40 100 69.20 70.079 12.52  
Inflation: consumer price index (year to year)  307 7.800 67.20 24 25.970 14.17  
Retired: # of retired people per 1000 of population 307 12.66 34.57 26.39 26.122 3.694  
Poverty: # of people living in poverty per 1000 of population 307 8 77.50 31.10 33.064 12.91  
External: dummy governor coming from another region  307 0 1 0 0.036 0.186  
First term: dummy for governor serving his first term  307 0 1 0 0.430 0.496  
Experience: governor’s cumulative in-office experience (full years) 307 0 14 5 5.713 3.495  
Governor’s age (full years)  307 35 73 54 54.075 8.026  
Temperature: election day average temperature (degrees Celsius)  307 –27.95 11 –3.300 –5.222 7.831  
2007–2012        
Unemployment: unemployment rate (%) 311 0.800 18.10 6.600 6.890 2.879  
RGRP: real gross regional product per capita (in 2005 prices) 311 46.71 2386.8 114.8 190.166 288.9  
Natural resources: share of natural resources in GRP (%) 311 0 73.90 1.900 10.168 16.38  
Urbanization: urbanization rate (%) 311 26.20 100 70.20 70.399 12.22  
Inflation: consumer price index (year to year)  311 3.100 16.50 8.300 9.120 3.410  
Retired: # of retired people per 1000 of population 311 18.55 36.50 27.98 28.147 3.252  
Poverty: # of people living in poverty per 1000 of population 311 5.700 45.30 15.70 16.391 5.830  
Elected: dummy for governor being directly elected  311 0 1 0 0.077 0.267  
External: dummy governor coming from another region  311 0 1 0 0.235 0.425  
First term: dummy for governor serving his first term  311 0 1 0 0.476 0.500  
Experience: governor’s cumulative in-office experience (full years) 311 0 21 5 6.653 5.355  
Governor’s age (full years) 311 35 74 55 54.248 8.065  
Temperature: election day average temperature (degrees Celsius)  311 –34.97 11 –5 –6.183 7.603  
 
Table 8: Summary statistics: Levada survey variables 
 Obs Min Max Median Mean St. Dev. 
Employer’s pressure: dummy for reporting some pressure 1563 0 1 0 0.122 0.328 
Married 1563 0 1 1 0.583 0.493 
Employed 1563 0 1 1 0.550 0.498 
Female 1563 0 1 1 0.551 0.498 
Higher education: dummy for having a university degree 1563 0 1 0 0.223 0.416 
Prosperity: Likert scale individual’s prosperity 1563 1 6 3 2.945 0.832 
Children: dummy for having children 1563 0 1 0 0.338 0.473 
 
